By: Andre Arzoo
andrearzoo@berkeley.edu

‘Football Diplomacy’ since last September: Negotiations between the governments in Ankara and Yerevan – a process which began last summer following Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s invitation to Turkish President Abdullah Gül to visit Armenia in host of the Turkish-Armenian World Cup Qualifying Football Match – have taken an uneasy and all to familiar turn this April. More importantly, there seems to be a lack of true insight.
Traditionally, Turkey-Armenia relations have been all but present. In 1993, the Turkish-Armenian border was closed by the government in Ankara as an act of solidarity with the ethnically-Turkic Republic of Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1987-94) between the latter and Armenian states. Since then, any manifestation in favor of reestablishing official diplomatic ties between Ankara and Yerevan - and thus reopening their mutual border as one of many results – have revolved around “set preconditions.”
These preconditions have been set forth and defended by both sides for almost two decades now; Turkey advocating for both an immediate settlement of the Karabakh Conflict along principles in favor of Azerbaijan and the establishment of a joint ‘Historical Commission’ made up of Armenian and Turkish historians to reevaluate and discuss the events of 1915 - a tragic event in which Armenians and elements of the International Community of States indisputably attribute as an act of genocide.
In contrast, the government in Yerevan – under former President Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008) - has traditionally advocated for Turkish Recognition of the Armenian Genocide and a reopening of their mutual border prior to the establishment of formal relations – both nations have yet to setup embassies or to have official representatives permanently established within each others’ borders. However, changes in Armenia’s Presidency following last February’s Presidential Elections, Russia’s political move in neighboring Georgia last summer, a crucial energy supply crisis in Turkey, and Western ambitions in the region directed by U.S. President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, seem to have dramatically changed this process to establish diplomatic relations within one of the key politically and military conflicted regions of the world.
After President Serzh Sargsyan’s invitation to his Turkish counterpart last year, numerous meetings have been held between the two sides – meetings that have taken place in countries from Russia and the Caucasus, to Europe – all of which fell along the sidelines of major international political and economic conferences outside of Turkey-Armenia talks. These meetings dramatically differed from those of the past due to both sides initially reaching an agreement to engage talks without set preconditions. However, it seems that this April has marked a change in the sensitive process of diplomacy or at least has revealed the hidden intentions behind them – which many have been arguing from the very beginning.
A vast political and social segment within the Armenian Community – both in Armenia and in the Diaspora – have expressed various sentiments and concerns regarding this new initiative by both governments to finally resolve their conflicting issues.
Outside Government-led Initiatives
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) - a historically influential political party/organization in the Diaspora and currently present member of the government coalition in Armenia - up until recent events this week (April 23-26) – has expressed serious concerns about the Armenian government’s forward-viewing pursuit to reestablish bilateral relations, a process led by President Sargsyan and his ruling Republican Party of Armenia faction.
The ARF bureau, the organizations leading committee, and the organization’s many senior members believe that the government in Ankara is craftily playing a political chess game in which Turkey is pushing the ongoing negotiations forward in order to prevent formal U.S. Recognition of the Armenian Genocide this year - distracting both President Obama with potential relations and the Armenian Government with a possible opening of the border. This concern has emerged within the context of refreshed preconditions that are being set forth by the Turkish Government; Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was quoted several times earlier this month for statements he made in relations to these refreshed preconditions, quoted by ‘haberturk.com’:
“Forget about the opening of the border with Armenia before the settlement of the Karabakh problem.”
The Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan has also gone on the record to state that:
"We don't say, 'Let's first solve one problem and solve the other later'…We want a similar process to start between Azerbaijan and Armenia. We are closely watching the talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”
As of April 25, 2009 - the Armenian Revolutionary Federation has resigned from the Armenian government because of the recently announced rapprochement deal between Turkey and Armenia - breaking off from the government coalition that consisted of the Republican Party of Armenia (the ruling party), the Prosperous Armenia Party, Orinats Yerkir, and the ARF - reports Radio Free Europe (RFE) - a Western media publication directed by the U.S. State Department:
"In a written statement, the Dashnaktsutyun leadership in Armenia reiterated the nationalist party’s condemnation of an agreement on the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations announced by the two governments on Wednesday. 'We also have fundamental disagreements with the Armenian authorities’ position on some issues raised during Armenia-Turkey negotiations', it said.
The dramatic move followed a Saturday meeting between [Sargsyan] and two Dashnaktsutyun leaders, Hrant Markarian and Armen Rustamian. According to the latter, Sarkisian briefed them on the essence of the still unpublicized 'roadmap' for gradually normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations. 'The president’s explanations did not satisfy us', Rustamian said on Monday.
Rustamian, who heads the Armenian parliament’s committee on foreign relations, confirmed that Dashnaktsutyun’s departure from the four-party coalition government means all members of the party holding senior positions in the executive and legislative branches must now tender their resignations. 'That process has already begun', he said.
In accordance its March 2008 power-sharing agreement, Dashnaktsutyun has been represented in [Sargsyan's] four-party coalition cabinet by three ministers and several deputy ministers. The influential party also holds 16 seats in the 131-member National Assembly.
Its exit will still leave [Sargsyan] with a comfortable majority in the parliament. His Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) alone controls at least half of the parliament seats."
Former Armenian Foreign Ministers Vartan Oskanian (1998-2008) and Raffi Hovannisian (1991-92) have also expressed similar concerns – arguing that if Ankara’s true intentions are to establish diplomatic ties then these intentions should soon come to fruition by a set deadline. If this deadline is not met, so the argument goes, the Armenian Government itself should reevaluate the negotiations and seriously consider pulling away so as to avoid further conflicting with other Armenian issues of interest. Mr. Oskanian – who is now head director of the 'Civilitas Foundation', a political think-tank established in 2008 so as to conduct analysis and policy subscriptions revolving around Armenia’s political and economic spheres – was quoted by RFE:
“When you make a Turkish-Armenian dialogue public, the Turks always take advantage of that because they face the genocide issue, the issue of European Union membership and the issue of friendship with Azerbaijan…So publicity here, if we let it last for long, is not to our benefit. With every day passing without border opening or normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, Turkey finds itself in a more beneficial position than Armenia.
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The Armenian side should set a clear deadline for the Turks -- if we sign an agreement and the border is opened on a particular day, it will be fine; if not, let us interrupt the negotiations from that day. Something has to be done.”
Mr. Hovannisian – Foreign Minister under First President Levon Ter-Petrossian, Heritage (Zharangutyun) Party leader, and current leader of Armenia’s Opposition Movement – has also expressed similar concerns regarding Turkish-held preconditions:
“I don’t anticipate the signing of a Turkish-Armenian agreement in the near future.”
Instead, Hovannisian points to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s calls for the United Nations Security Council to “denounce Armenia as an ‘occupier’ and demand Karabakh’s return under Azerbaijani rule,” reports Radio Free Europe. Once again reaffirming Turkey’s links of Armenian political issues to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict – not to mention the Turkish Government’s precondition that Armenia recognize the current Turkish border - under the 1921 Treaty of Kars - and sacrifice any current or future claims to Western Armenia (or Eastern Anatolia).
The Armenian National Congress (HAK) – a political body formed outside of the Armenian National Assembly (Armenia’s Parliament) and made up of various key Armenian political parties opposed to the ruling government – seem to have the same stance in odds with the ongoing Turkey-Armenia negotiations. Levon Zurabian, a senior representative of the opposition’s National Congress has stated that:
“By and large, we welcome Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and the possible opening of the border…but there are some reports to the effect that Armenia will have to satisfy a number of conditions for the sake of that reconciliation. In particular, the establishment of the so-called commission of historians.”
A commission in which many in the Armenian political sphere believe will undermine the solidity of Armenian efforts to advocate for genocide recognition abroad – arguing that the very act of establishing such a commission would not only harm the validity of describing the events as genocide but will also redirect Armenian efforts of U.S. Genocide Recognition within the Diaspora toward a position that is less than favorable, as well as harming any future efforts for Turkish Recognition as well.
The argument is, or at least a clear analysis of, that once a commission is established – as a result, the U.S. Government would avoid domestic efforts for recognition and instead advocate for a Turkish-Armenian led effort to resolve the issue – as Obama’s visit to Ankara in March and his following statements have proven.
Similarly and more importantly, as of April 23, 2009 Armenia and Turkey announced a 'Road Map' to normalize ties - quotes RFE in a joint statement released by both Turkish and Armenian Foreign Ministries:
“The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner."
However, the statement released lacks any discussion of whether relations will be fully established before the settlement of the Karabakh Conflict and whether or not the mutual border will be opened any time soon. Instead, a Turkish government official is quoted by RFE as stating that the opening of the said border is "out of the question." The Turkish Foreign Ministry has gone on to state:
“We will continue with our policy of silent diplomacy. The time has not come yet to make announcements on specifics nor on timelines."
As a result of the April 23rd joint Road Map statement, President Obama stepped aside from his pledge to recognize the Armenian Genocide on April 24 as such, instead calling the events a "massacre" and "Medz Yeghren" - 'Great Calamity' in Armenian - in his attempt to please both sides and avoid "hampering" any ongoing negotiations between the two former nations:
"Ninety four years ago, one of the great atrocities of the 20th century began. Each year, we pause to remember the 1.5 million Armenians who were subsequently massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. The Meds Yeghern must live on in our memories, just as it lives on in the hearts of the Armenian people.
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The best way to advance that goal right now is for the Armenian and Turkish people to address the facts of the past as a part of their efforts to move forward. I strongly support efforts by the Turkish and Armenian people to work through this painful history in a way that is honest, open, and constructive. To that end, there has been courageous and important dialogue among Armenians and Turks, and within Turkey itself. I also strongly support the efforts by Turkey and Armenia to normalize their bilateral relations. Under Swiss auspices, the two governments have agreed on a framework and roadmap for normalization. I commend this progress, and urge them to fulfill its promise."
April 24th is marked as "Armenian Remembrance Day" on the WhiteHouse calender, where the acting President at the time addresses the American public in regard to the Armenian Genocide - as former President Bush did throughout his presidency. However, each presiding President has failed to use the term genocide when describing the events of 1915 and instead describes the events as a result of "massacre" and "deportations." President Obama, on the other hand, not only failed to live up to his promise to the Armenian-American Community of rightfully describing the events as genocide but also failed to give a live public address; instead he released a statement on the WhiteHouse Website - which many criticize and compare to the actions of the former president where President Bush at least was straight forward in his denial.
Beyond the Political Game: Economic & Criminal Implications
Regardless of the political aspects behind this process of reconciliation – which has been publically identified as a process of "rapprochement" – there has been a short falling of any genuine or reasonable study and analysis of the social and economic implications that would follow both opening the borders and solidifying relations - a border which would not only open the Republic of Armenia and its population to Turkey but also to Europe via Turkey-Armenia. If tomorrow morning the Turkish and Armenian Governments were to make a deal in terms of formalizing permanent bilateral relations, and thus reopening the Turkish-Armenian border, what plans have the two governments laid forth in managing the process and what policies have been or are in the process of being formulated to deal with the exchange of commerce, human capital, and the possibility of criminal elements?
The Armenian domestic market is in size, input, and output, no way comparable to that of Turkey - with Turkey ranking in the top 20 economies in the world. In addition, the global economic crisis has substantially hit the Armenian economy in both its input and output - as well as Turkey's domestic economy and its workers abroad - forcing the Armenian Government to turn to external agencies for capital and has caused significant contraction from its once “double digit” yearly rise. This double digit pattern has repeated itself for the last decade or so, although a considerable amount of this pattern has been due to remittances from Armenians working and living abroad, foreign investment (Diasporan for the most part), and tourism. All of which have taken additional hits as a result of domestic political turmoil following last year's Presidential Election, the inflation of the Dram (which has only recently been adjusted), and reduction of tourism. The 'Armenian Economist' reports:
"Remittances, as measured by the inflow of noncommercial transfers to individuals through commercial banks, maintained a robust pattern of growth through December of 2008. This is truly impressive given all the shocks that the country experienced. January is a different story where transfers slowed down by some 25 percent year over year. Two questions: why did remittances continue to grow through December, and, two, what does January foretell about the future?"
The Armenian Economy has taken additional blows in terms of Real Estate and its national currency - the Dram - due to the ongoing global economic crisis and the recent Georgian-Russian War:
"Compared to 2007, sales dipped by 5 percent in March following the disturbances in Yerevan on the first of the month. In early August, war broke out between Georgia and Russia which in effect cut off Armenia's links to most of its trading partners. Real estate transactions dropped by 22 percent in that month compared to sales in August of 2007. And it has been on the decline ever since, with sales lower than the comparable figures for 2007 by 35 percent in November. Obviously instability in Georgia does not bode well for Armenia. It is not clear whether the global financial crisis has hit Armenia as of yet, and very difficult to glean its impact through the real estate market with the information at hand.
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The share of Dram denominated bank deposits dropped from 63 percent of total deposits at the end of November to 39 percent in February. Other than the fear of the uncertainties of the global financial crises, and the related flight to quality, it is not clear what else explains this trend. What is certain however is that so much Drams cannot be dumped without depressing its value. The CBA could not defend the Dram at 305 units to the USD, and perhaps should not have intervened. In early March it gave up and stopped its intervention and the value of the Dram dropped to about 365 units per USD. Two questions: What would have happened had the CBA not intervened? The chart below may tell one story, but that is too simplistic. Second, why do econometric models of exchange rates ignore the composition of deposits and its information content?"
An open shared-border would equate to an even more open and shared-economic market between Turkey and Armenia. Hence, Armenia’s market would be open to excess consumer products coming in from Turkey replacing Armenian domestic products for cheaper Turkish ones, and decreasing production and distribution as a result. Unless regulation policies have already been set for implementation once the borders are opened so as to prevent such an influx of foreign products, Armenia’s domestic market would feel a dramatic shift at its base – the likelihood of which unemployment would rise as competing domestic producers close down in the face of new Turkish competitors.
On top of these issues, the real possibility of increased immigration out of Armenia also holds its own ground – further reducing the population, labor market, and societal base - a serious national security and population threat. Thus, a newly open boarder would give way to increased efforts in expatriation and human trafficking.
As one article published earlier this month in ‘The Armenian Weekly’ noted:
“Turkey is a relatively vast and largely populated nation with the second largest standing army in NATO and one of the 20 largest economies in the world, boasting centuries of experience in diplomacy, warfare, and the subjugation of weaker neighbors.
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What has the government of Armenia done to address trade, regulatory, and logistic issues associated with the opening of the border? What steps has the government of Armenia taken to help establish industries that can compete in an open market? What products does Armenia have to offer to Turkey besides cognac, beer, juices, cigarettes, jams, and fruits, all of which are readily available in Turkey via internal production and import? At the current rate, the opening will result in the flooding in of Turkish products in Armenia, bypassing the pre-existing clandestine trade route through Georgia; Turkish ownership of the few remaining businesses and commodities that are not owned by Russia; and total foreign control of the local economy from grains to fuel and other necessities, resulting in the ultimate subjugation of Armenia to the economic and political will of foreign entities, specifically a state with Armenian blood on its hands.”
These are some broad issues and questions at the general level that are at the face of the economic factor when discussing the opening of the border – we’re just scratching the surface here. Regardless, the point is that serious and legitimate studies must be conducted – research which should have been done prior to beginning negotiations – research that should be conducted by the Armenian Government, Armenian Central Bank, and Armenian Economists Abroad so as to measure the costs and benefits of any economic implications that would follow a border opening. The question of whether or not the Armenian economy is ready for such an expansion should be at the top of government priority, as well as that of Armenians in general. Anyone who follows economics or the Armenian economy knows that Armenia’s domestic market is far from ready to compete with an increasingly more dominant and vast foreign economy.
Aside from these economic regulatory issues, but also in relation to, stands the issue of crime. Unfortunately, Armenia is plagued by its own criminal elements – in terms of economic monopolization by local oligarchs, post-Soviet sex trade networks, and organized crime in general, to name the more crucial ones. How much more so would these sectors expand once similar Turkish criminal elements wash up onto Armenia’s streets looking for a new base of operation and extraction? In contrast, how much more extensive will Armenian organized crime elements and oligarchs expand their power and influence once outreaching into Turkey as well? Dealing with Armenia’s criminal sector, both in the government hierarchy and on the ground level, have been serious issues for the young republic and society – to which a new border would only bring a further layer of criminal elements, resources, and even violence.
Turkish-Armenian Relations are a multi-faceted issue; one has to consider the economic, political, criminal, social, and human capital implications when genuinely assessing bilateral relations and the opening of borders. The Republic of Armenia is politically, socially, and economically a young and vulnerable player in this global game – Turkey being the closest threat in all of these regards. One may argue the same for Russia or Iran; however, the Armenian Republic has already had almost two decades of experience (whether in a positive or negative light) in dealing with these two foreign economies and their various consequences. Turkey, however, is a new factor – one in which history has REPEATEDLY demonstrated that we cannot afford to play games with, nonetheless lose.
Either way, a serious academic assessment must be made at the highest levels in order to defend the economic, political, and social rights of the Armenian nation and of ALL Armenian people - in Armenia and the Diaspora. Without which we are destined, yet again, to fall victim to the possibly fatal blows of globalization, regional power grabs, and exploitation by our surrounding neighbors. Nonetheless; Genocide Recognition, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia’s economy should not be sacrificed, forced through, or endangered in any way shape or form so as to establish relations and open a border with a traditional foe who has repeatedly taken any opportunity at hand to deal blows to the Armenian nation. Establishing diplomatic relations and expanding the access along Armenia’s borders are crucial factors in developing and strengthening the republic, but at the right time and in the right way.