Wednesday, September 17, 2008

Artsakh Conflict: The Threat of War with Azerbaijan (Fall 07)

by Alex Yerevanian

Although I had read and heard much about the Nagorno-Karabakh War in the classroom and in newspapers, I never fully understood its effect on the cities of Artsakh until I visited Shushi on a class trip in 2005. The bullet-ridden buildings, roads left in disrepair, and the abundance of expended ammunition easily available on the ground for children to collect all served as a poignant reminder of the 6 year struggle with Azerbaijan that took place more than a decade ago. Since 1994, Artsakh’s infrastructure has slightly recovered and a cease fire has been called, but the situation has been in recent times more volatile than ever. Recent political developments pose an unavoidable question: is it possible for war to break out again?

The OSCE Minsk group, created in 1992 and consisting of Russia, United States, and France, has as its objective promoting the negotiation of a peaceful resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan. With Armenia and Azerbaijan still formally at war, that objective is far from being realized. Even though Presidents Robert Kocharian and Ilham Aliyev have met multiple times over the course of more than a decade, little has changed on the diplomatic front since the cease fire was signed in 1994.

From the military and economic perspective, the size and growth of Azerbaijan’s military budget has especially been an area of concern. Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev released a statement in 2005 that Azerbaijan’s military budget would double to $600 million in 2006, and that if necessary their “army is always able to regain [Artsakh] by military force.” With the Azeri budget closing at approximately $900 million in October 2006, the 2005 estimate of $100 million for Armenia’s military budget pales in comparison.

Azerbaijan officially maintains that at least 10% of its land is occupied by Armenians. Given their retreat and the thousands of Azeri refugees from Armenia and Artsakh, any dissent towards this war in Azerbaijan may be drowned out by a passionate hatred for Armenians. We can also recall the flagrant vandalism of Armenian cultural artifacts in Julfa in late 2005. This rather recent attempt at the elimination of any trace of Armenian settlement is a blunt reminder of the general Azeri attitude towards Armenians.

With so much tension, what is preventing a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia?

Artsakh remains one of the worlds most heavily mined territories in the world. While Karabagh has never produced or exported any landmines, it has a considerable number of old soviet anti-personnel landmines, such as the PMN-2, and miscellaneous unexploded ordinances littered across the country. In 2002, the Karabagh Ministry of Agriculture stated that 37 million square meters of arable land are affected by land mines.

This, of course, presents a huge safety issue for the residents of Karabagh, especially for civilians and children who do not recognize the dangers of unexploded munitions. The United Nations reports 123 people have been killed and over 300 injured in Artsakh due to landmines since 1994. Despite the dangerous nature of the landmine situation in Karabagh, it nonetheless provides a natural defense against an invasion. It could be particularly disastrous for Azerbaijan, which is less familiar with the territory and potential location of minefields, to haul troops and heavy equipment across affected land.

Azerbaijan’s oil industry has a long and prosperous history, and is expected to continually grow from its current rate of production (800,000 barrels of oil a day) to 1.2 million barrels in the near future. Naturally, any disruption to Azerbaijan’s oil industry would be a crippling blow to their economy and trade. Although it is unclear how capable Armenia is at destroying Azeri oil pipelines/infrastructure, there are several parties which would not want to risk a conflict that could push Armenia to do so.

The infrastructure of the Azeri oil industry is heavily built on foreign investment, particularly from the United States and other nations which would not want to see their economic interests jeopardized by a regional conflict. President Ilham Aliyev may have significant personal ties to the oil industry as well. In 2003, an investigative report was filed by the Committee of Oil Industry Workers’ Rights Protection on the corruption in the Azeri Oil Industry when Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev’s father, was head of the State Oil Company and discusses how oil profits often do not flow through the state budget. Why should Ilham Aliyev wage a war if it would mean jeopardizing such a steady flow of income?

Of course, our neighbors have significant influence in the fate of the cease fire and future peace developments. Turkey is a huge supporter of Azerbaijan, as is Pakistan and Chechnya. Their assistance has been critical for Azerbaijan’s military growth, and as a natural political enemy to Armenia, Turkey has nearly no qualms lending aid to its ally.

In the event of a war, the Iranians would not want a full Azeri victory because their increased geopolitical isolation requires them to be on good terms with Armenia as an outlet. Also, it is important to note that millions of ethnic Azeris reside in Northern Iran. By allowing Azerbaijan to conquer Karabagh, Iran would open the possibility of popular dissent and even uprising by Azeris wishing to fulfill the Greater Azerbaijan concept. This is not unlike the situation in Northern Iraq right now; increased instability in Iraq opens the possibility for the Kurds to carve out their own nation, possibly encroaching upon Turkish territory.

The Russians would not want the Armenians to have a crushing victory either because, aside from the fact that they can continue to sell arms as long as conflict or tension is present in the region, a fully recognized liberated Armenian state in Artsakh will encourage other small would-be republics such as Chechnya and other Russian states to go into uprising as well.

In conclusion, the tense diplomatic and military situation in Artsakh is currently Armenia’s most pressing national security issue. Artsakh requires stronger offensive capabilities to discourage a full scale war, and must remain very diplomatically active with its neighbors to attract awareness and maintain the peace.

Armenia would not be able to sustain a long war with Azerbaijan; it simply has neither the internal resources nor the external support to keep up a fight for very long. Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora should do everything in its power to maintain the cease fire or come to a peace agreement, and should war prove to be inevitable, we must be prepared to bring the conflict to an end as quickly as possible.

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